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19581 1'IECENT CASES
states where the insurer may be and is joined as a defendant, or sued directly
hy the injured party, the issue is triable as a 'part of the main cause and the
courts deny declaratory relief.5
The propriety of a declaratory judgment where another action is pending
involving the same set of facts is a matter of dispute., Generally such relief
will be granted, provided (1) the trial of the main cause will not determine
the matter in controversy, 7 (2) such relief will not prejudicially affect the
injured party by a trial of the issue,s and (3) the parties and facts are not
identical in both actions.0
North Dakota would presurnably follow the reasoning of this case in grant-
ing declaratory relief although no cases directly in point were found.'o There
is a plausible policy argument against permitting such an action on the part
of an insurer." In a case of this nature the insurance company must in effect
attempt to prove the insured to be liable, i. e., a drunken driver, and upon
failing must turn around and defend against that which they had formerly
sought to establish.' 2 However, the weight of authority allows such. actions
to be brought, and it would appear that where an actual controversy exists an
insurance company should be entitled to have its rights deternined without
the expense of an unwarranted claim.
WILLIAM J. MCMENAMY.
INSURANCE - INSU',En's D'sIES TO INSURED - LIABILITY OF INSUltER FOH
JUDGMENT IN ExcEss OF Poricy LINMITS.- Action against insurer, who had
agreed to indemnify insured fe.r damages to insured's employees, to recover
amount in excess of policy limit paid by insured in discharge of judgment
against it for injury to employee. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held,
two justices dissenting, that the finding that insurer had not exercised good
faith in handling claim-u for less than the policy limit was sustained by the
evidence, and hence insurer was liable for excess over policy limits. Amer-
5. Auto Mut. Indem._Co , v. Moore, 235 Ala. 426, 179 So. 368 (1938); New Am-
sterdam Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 238 Wis. 550, 300 N.W. 367 (1941).
6. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments § 209 (2nd ed. 1951).
7. Continental Cas. Co. v. National Household Distributors, 32 F.Supp. 849 (E.D.
Vis. 1940); Strawn v. Sarpy County, 146 Neb. 783, 21 N.W.2d 597 (1946).
8. United States F. & G. Co. v. Savoy Grill, 51 Ohio App. 504, 1 N.E.2d 946
(1936). N. D. Rev. Code § 32-2311 (1943): "PARTIES. When declaratory relief is
sought, all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the dec-
lamation, shall be made parties, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding. ; see Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Warner, 77 N. D. 729,
45 N.W.2d 196 (1950).
9. See note 4 supra.
10. Cf., Iverson v. Tweeden, 78 N. D. 132, 48 N.W.2d 367 (1951); Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Warner, 77 N.D. 729, 45 N.W.2d 196 (1950); Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Mustad, 76 N.D. 84, 33 N.W.2d 436 (1948); Asbury Hospital. v. Cass County, 72 N.D.
359, 7 N.W.2d 438 (1943); Langer v. State, 69 N.D. '129, 284 N.W. 238 (1939); C.
W. Jones Lumber Co. v. City of Marmarth, 67 N.D. 309, 272 N.W. 190 (1937). Min-
nesota has followed the-rule of the principal case in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Skuluzacek, 208 Minn. 443, 294 N.W. 413 (1940).
11. McFarland v. 'Cremshaw, 160 Tenn. 170, 22 S.W.2d 229 (1929). See also
Heller v. Shapiro, 208.Vvis. 310, 242 N.W. 174 (1932). ..
12. In the instant'!case. the dissenting justice stated, "Here the insurance company
tried and did prove its own assured to be a drunkard to the satisfaction of the. trial judge,
who made findings to that effect, and now, that we reverse the case; 'the selfsame insur-
ance company is duty-bound to reverse its role and do everything in its power to prove
that the assured was as sober as the trial judge, under the very covenant from which
unsuccessfully it attempted to extricate itself."
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can Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. L. C. Jones Trucking Co., 312 P.2d 685 (Okla.
1958).
It is generally agreed that in an indemnity or liability policy, where the
insurer reserves the exclusive right to contest or settle any claim brought
against the insured, and prohibits him from voluntarily assuming any liability
or settling any claim without the insurer's consent, except at his own cost, the
insurer has the option either to compromise or settle such claims.' These
provisions impose no contract obligation either express or implied to settle
or compromise. The insurer's failure or refusal to settle or compromise such
a claim for an amount within the policy limits permits no action in assumpsit
or on the contract against the insurer if a judgment is recovered against the
insured in excess of the policy limits.-
The power vested in the insurer to settle or compromise claims brought
against the insured must be used in good faith.3 In exercising good faith, the
insurer is' generally held to that degree of care and diligence which an ordi-
narily prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business
affairs. 4 The decision to refuse settlement, to be a good faith conclusion, must
be honest and intelligent; in order to be honest and intelligent, it must he
based upon a knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which liability
is predicated, and upon a knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries
so far as they can be reasonably ascertained., Thus, an insurer is not liable
for failure to make a settlement in a situation where a reasonably prudent per-
son exercising due care from the standpoint of the insured would not have
made it.6 The insurer's refusal of settlement is deemed in good faith if made
in the honest belief that it has a fair chance of victory in the event of liti-
gation; 7 that the verdict may be kept within the policy limits;' that the comp-
romise offer is excessive: 9 that it has "legal defenses as yet undertermined by
a court of last resort, which tairly seem applicable. ' o
The instant case, however, is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions.
They hold that where the insurer is guilty of bad faith, it may be liable in tort
for failing or refusing to compromise or settle a claim brought against the
1. See, e.g., State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d '730 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U. S. 591 (1939); Kingan and Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Ind. App.
301, 115 N.E. 348 (1917); Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 Atl.
788 (1936).
2. See, e. g., Averbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort General Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E. 352 (1923);
Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643, 644 (1929) (dictum).
3. See, e.g., Davis v. Maryland Cas. Co., 16 La. App. 253 133 So. 769 (1931);
Norwood v. Travelers ins. Co., 204 Minn. 595, 284 N.W. 785 (1939).
4. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938); American
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. L. C. Jones Trucking Co., 312 P.2d 685, 687 (Okla. 1958)
(The fairest method of balancing the interests is for the insurer to treat the claim as if
he alone were liable for the entire amount.); G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American
Indemnity Co.; 295 S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1927).
5. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 319 P.2d 69 (Cal. 1958); Hilker v. Western
Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
6. Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937).
7. New Orleans & C. Ry. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 La. 154, 38 So. 89 (1905).
8. Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929); G. A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 295 S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
9. Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 173 Minn. 440, 211 N.W. 317
(1926); Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
10. Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643, 645 (1929)
(dictum).
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insured for an amount within the policy limits.'" That liability is measured
by the excess of a judgment recovered against the insured over the amount
payable by the terms'of the policy.'
Ordinarily, the question of had faith is within the jury's province, but the
various higher courts have, held that such bad faith must be clearly and
reasonably shown in order to sustain a verdict against the insurer.":
Bad faith has been demonstrated to be a complete disregard of the insured's
financial interests,' 4 an arbitrary refusal to settle for a reasonable sum where
it is apparent from an honest perusal of the facts and the law that a suit
would result in a verdict in excess of the policy limits,-, or a refusal to
compromise upon grounds which depart from the grant of power to the in-
surer to exclusively conduct settlement negotiations.' 6
Whether or not the insurer is liable for the difference in a recovery over
the excess of the policy limits depends on the judgment and the good faith
of the insurance company and its representatives.
DENNIS M. SOBOLIK.
INTOXICATING LiQoUtRs - Civii_ DAMAGE LAWS - INJURIES TO PERSON. -
In an action tinder the Illinois Dram Shop Act against defendants who alleg-
edly sold liquor to'the driver of the car in which plaintiff was injured, a sum-
mary judgment was granted for the defendants on the ground that plaintiff
was not an innocent party inasmuch as he participated in the drinking of
liquor with the driver. The Appellate Court, Third Division, of Illinois, held
that whether or not plaintiff was an innocent party under the law was a
question of fact for the jury and that the motion for summary judgment
should have been overruled. Nes~s v. Bilbob Inn, 15 Ill. App. 2d 340, 146
N.E.2d 234 (1957).
At common law, no legal liability was imposed on a seller of intoxicating
liquor for damages resulting from intoxication.' Many jurisdictions have,
however, created such liability by enacting so called "Dram Shop" or "Civil
Damage Acts".- These acts have several purposes: they are designed, pur-
suant to the police ppwer, to promote the public health, safety, morals and
welfare by affording a remedy for injuries resulting from the wrongful con-
duct of intoxicated persons;3 they promote temperance in the use of intoxi-
cating beverages; and they provide a necessary check on the liquor traffic.
Such acts, in this way, shift the burden of potential loss from the defenseless
public to the owner of the dram shop who has the choice of bearing the
11. Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61
(1928); Aycock Hosiery Mill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S.W.2d 889
(1928); Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 10 Wash.2d 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941)
'(A mistake of judgment is not bad faith).
12. Ibid.
13. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643
(1929); Mendota Electric Co. v. New York Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W.
61 (1928).
14. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
15. Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643, 645 (1929)
(dictum).
16. Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co:, 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
1. Hyba v. C. A. Horneman lee., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939); Cruse
v. Aden, 127 I11. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
2. E.g., Minn., Mich., Iowa, Wis.
3. See Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 111. 376, 66 N.E.2d 370 (1946).
